This article tries to present the main areas of Polish foreign and security policy.Poland's membership in the EU and in NATO was the strongest determinant of its position in international relations, and the guiding light of its foreign policy. Poland's work in the EU was focused in particular on EU policy towards its eastern neighbours, common energy policy and security issues, while in NATO, Poland has always been a proponent of the open doors policy and has maintained close relationship with the US, supporting many of its policies and initiatives.
Internal and External Aspects 2
Starting in 1989, Poland successfully transformed its political system from an undemocratic regime into a democracy. The principles of democratic order, the rule of law, respect for human rights and solidarity became the foundations of the state. Poland became a member of the Council of Europe (1991), the World Trade Organization (1995) , and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (1996) . The crowing accomplishment of Polish foreign policy was the country's accession to NATO in 1999 Poland's membership in the EU and in NATO was the strongest determinant of its position in international relations, and the guiding light of its foreign policy. Under the 1997 constitution, the objectives of Poland's foreign policy were to safeguard the sovereignty of the state, its security and the integrity of its territory. NATO was the best choice for Poland to develop the security policy in cooperation with the United States. The EU, on the other hand, provided the means and opportunities for a rapid general development of the country. Thanks to EU funds and policies, alongside to the new opportunities in communications, infrastructure, trade, education, and other areas, the modernization of the country took place. In the first decade of Poland's membership in the EU, the country's GDP increased from PLN 884 billion to PLN 1600 billion, and Poland reached the level of over 60% of the EU's level of economic development While it was certainly possible to make better use of EU funds, the above-cited numbers -alongside the steady economic growth 6 -meant that Poland was considered a leader among the 'new' EU member states. Nevertheless, it didn't enter the Eurozone.
In the same period, the public debt increased significantly, from PLN 431,4 billion in 2004 to PLN 780 billion in 2015. Compared to other European countries, Poland is also lagging behind in terms of compensation for work. Average monthly earnings went up from EUR 530 in 2004 to over EUR 1000 euro in March 2014 in the business sector. However, average earnings in Poland (in USD) amount to just over 32% of that of Germany, 31% of France, 26% of United Kingdom and 41% of Spain (134% of that of Hungary) 7 . This has created a powerful social frustration, powering economic migration on a drastic scale. In 2004-2014, almost 1.8 million Poles left the country. Given the country's birth rate of 9,97 8 , this has exacerbated the demographic problems. Poland also continues to struggle with certain challenges. In the Global Innovation Index 2009-2010, Poland ranks poorly at 47, despite its economy being ranked at a much better position (20).
While euroscepticism is on the rise in Europe (largely due to the financial crisis of 2008), Poland and the Polish society have remained greatly enthusiastic towards the EU, becoming one of Germany's strongest allies in its efforts towards reform and further integration. Support for Poland's membership in the EU is at the level of 72% 9 .
As a member of NATO and the EU, Poland was located at their borders, a strong determinant of its foreign policy. With regard to the neighbouring countries of Ukraine and Belarus, Poland's policy objective was to foster democratization and the promotion of improved relations with Western institutions. Relations with Russia continued to present the greatest challenge. This was due to two reasons: firstly, problems rooted in the period before 1989, when Poland was part of the Eastern block controlled by the USSR and Poland's reorientation, and, secondly, the different visions for the future of post-Soviet states. While Russia pursued a future in which these countries were in its sphere of influence, Poland made efforts to bring them as close as possible to the West.
In the 1990s, the pursuit of foreign policy objectives in Poland was facilitated by a consensus worked out by all the political parties on the integration into the Western institutions and normalization of relations with Poland's neighbours to the east. After the EU accession, gradually differences began to emerge between the most influential political parties: Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska) and Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość). Both of these parties agreed that membership in NATO and the EU provided the foundation of security and development of the country, and both were in favour of strengthening relations with the United States. However, they differed in their approaches to the manner in which foreign policy should be implemented, and which issues should prevail. The Law and Justice administration in 2007-2008 and later after 2015 was and is eurosceptical, distrustful towards Germany, and with very limited initiatives in the relations with Russia. On the other hand, policy making of the Civic Platform's administration in 2008-2015 was strongly pro-European.
Institutionally, foreign policy in Poland is the responsibility of the government, headed by the prime minister. Foreign policy is coordinated by the foreign minister, but the president also has the right to become involved. As a representative of the state in its external relations, the president is expected to cooperate in this area with the prime minister and the foreign minister.
Formally, a document entitled Foundations of Poland's foreign policy, approved by the government at the request of the foreign minister, forms the basis of Poland's foreign policy. The Foundations… serves as guidelines for the government departments as they develop their own foreign cooperation plans. Every year, the foreign minister presents a report to the Parliament (entitled Information on foreign policy), outlining the key policy objectives 10 .
Poland in the European Union
Poland's accession to the EU triggered a fundamental reorganization of the country's foreign 9 "European Youth in 2014", Eurobarometer, p.11. 10 In March 2012, the Council of Ministers adopted the Priorities of Polish foreign policy, the first long-term strategy paper on foreign policy (including European policy) since 1989. This key document guides the Polish diplomacy in its operations. Its purpose is to coordinate the work of the administration with regard to external relations. Moreover, it presents to the general public the vision and key objectives for Polish foreign policy up to 2016. policy. A full mobilization for the foreign service and multiple adaptation of ministry structures were necessary to meet the challenges resulting from the membership 11 .
The first years in the EU made it evident that Poland had no clear vision of the future of the Union. It took time for the country to gain experience and develop a constructive approach to policy within Europe. The EU membership in itself was a huge adjustment for Poland, which was not immediately ready to discuss further stages of European integration. There was a concern that the EU might become dominated by the largest member states 12 . The Polish government supported a vision of a European Union of sovereign member states rather than a federation of states.
This approach was reflected in the country's position during the drafting of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe 13 and of the Lisbon Treaty thereafter. Polish leaders in general, and President Lech Kaczyński in particular, were reluctant to accept the Lisbon Treaty, expressing hesitation as to whether it was at all necessary. Poland opposed the efforts to boost the powers of European institutions, including the proposal to appoint a president of the European Council and to uphold the principle of 'one state -one commissioner' for the European Commission. It also protested against the changes in the decision-making system unfavourable for small and medium-sized countries (where a decision would require a majority of 55% countries and 65% of their population). It pursued the strengthening of cooperation on European Security and Defence Policy and an expansion of the solidarity clause to also cover energy security.
Poland only ratified the Lisbon Treaty after the second Irish referendum, on 10 October 2009 14 . As a result, it was viewed as a country for which European cooperation is not a priority. This image was further reinforced by Poland's support for an involvement in the war in Iraq, criticized by countries such as Germany and France. The prevalent view in Poland, however, was that Polish security interests require close cooperation with the United States, including ventures as controversial as the war in Iraq, due to a variety of reasons (including the belief that EU's defence capacity is insufficient).
The government formed by the Civic Platform and the Polish People's Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe), which was in power for two terms of office in 2008-2015, endeavoured to shift the perception of Poland within the EU. When the new foreign minister Radosław Sikorski presented his first foreign policy report to the Sejm on 7 May 2008, he declared that his first priority would be to make Poland 'strong with the strength of European Union's solidarity', and he went on to speak at length about the EU, saying for example: "The European Union is not the dangerous "them", Europe and the Union is just "us"' 15 . In his address to the Sejm on 29 April 2012, he said that Poland supports an EU where the member states are forever sovereign and maintain the right to leave the Union, as well as the right to determine the powers transferred to the community. He argued in favour of a 'smart federation', which would be a 'way towards a greater power, built together, and not towards a loss of identity'
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. Polish foreign policy continued in this spirit for the next seven years, to the 11 The government proposed the bill on the coordination of matters related to the membership of Poland's work in the EU was focused in particular on EU policy towards its eastern neighbours, common energy policy and security issues. Poland's most important initiative, put forward jointly with Sweden, was the Eastern Partnership, approved on 19 June 2008 by the European Council. Its objective was to bring about closer cooperation between the EU and Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus (on the condition that the latter chooses to begin the process of democratization). The objective of the Eastern Partnership was to develop a mechanism for permanent institutional cooperation in the following areas: politics, security, economy, social issues, financial issues, environmental issues, borders, and the movement of persons The Eastern Partnership was also used to develop diplomatic cooperation with Sweden and Germany (from which the project had garnered strong support). Bi-and trilateral visits in Eastern Partnership countries were held relatively often. Additionally, Poland started a parallel project: the European Endowment for Democracy, first proposed by Radosław Sikorski in January 2011, and then launched during Poland's EU presidency. The fund was designed to support organizations and individuals in EU's eastern and southern neighbouring states working in the area of advancing democracy 21 . Poland has been one of the largest contributors to the fund, providing EUR 5 million by 2015.
Polish diplomacy was also hard at work on the issue of energy solidarity. This is due to the country's strong dependence on Russian oil and natural gas. In 2006, approx. 91.5% of imported natural gas came from countries situated east of Poland, including 68.2% from the Russian Federation. There were several aspects of Poland's energy policy. Firstly, Poland supported the development of a common energy policy for the entire EU. Secondly, it 17 Law and Justice argued that a tighter political union would weaken the states and thus the entire European Union, and also cause the 'reign of the more powerful'. See: Transcript of the eleventh sitting of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 29 March 2012, Warsaw 2012. 18 The project gained popularity in the European Union after the war between Russia and Georgia, and after the 'gas crisis' between Russia and Ukraine. These events demonstrated to the European Union that there was a need for action that would encourage democratization and stabilization in the states neighbouring it to the east. Poland and Ukraine pay the highest prices for the Russian natural gas in all of Europe. Therefore, Poland was interested in the potential development of a common energy supply system and pursued a broader energy solidarity clause for the EU. Poland's position was that the clause should become applicable when one member state loses access to natural gas. It argued that developing a common energy market helps to diminish the risk of potential blackmail of Eastern European countries by Russia and thus of the entire EU becoming entangled. Once the conflict in Ukraine began in 2014, the matter took on an extra urgency for Poland. Poland took decisive steps towards developing the energy union, with a vision far exceeding the EU. The following elements were proposed: development of energy infrastructure between EU member states and their neighbours; solidarity mechanisms in case of a supply crisis; using the bargaining power of the entire EU in negotiations with suppliers; using domestic energy sources; diversification of supply sources; working to strengthen the energy security of the states neighbouring the EU. Most of these elements were incorporated into the energy union strategy presented by the European Commission on 25 February 2015. However, the strategy contains no hard language on joint (shared) natural gas purchases in the future.
Due to its history and geopolitical location, Poland's foreign policy has always been strongly focused on security issues. The question of the EU's ability to guarantee security, along with its defence potential, has been at the forefront of concern for every government. National security strategy documents adopted in 2007 and 2014 both supported the development of a European security policy. 23 In the Lisbon Treaty, Poland was a proponent of the provision demanding solidarity in defence matters (188c). It also supported the advancement of the security and defence policy proposed by France during its presidency in 2008, and on numerous occasion advocated a revision and redevelopment of the security and defence policy of the EU.
The events of 2015 undermined the image of Poland as a pro-European country that observes the principle of solidarity in the face of EU-wide challenges. Two factors were instrumental in this process:
Firstly, Polish authorities were sceptical towards the unconditional welcome extended towards the masses of refugees and migrants (in particular by Germany). In defence of its position, Poland mentioned the increased immigration for Ukraine. According to Eurostat data, Poland absorbed the second-largest number of Ukrainian immigrants (after Great Britain): an estimated 355,4 thousand people in 2014 24 . At the end of 2015, it was estimated that over 800,000 immigrants had found work in Poland. Security and cultural factors were also invoked. Pressured and criticized by the EU, which argued that Poland was violating the solidarity principle, the country eventually agreed to accept 7,000 refugees, while continuing to uphold its opposition towards fixed mandatory quotas for redistribution of the incoming refugees. 22 Poland has cooperated in this respect with Qatar and the United States. In 2016, facilities for handling imported natural gas were launched in Świnoujście. PKN Orlen, a Polish investor, also acquired the refinery Możejki Nafta, but in July 2007 Russia cut off its oil supply along the Friendship Pipeline. Secondly, after eight years of coalition government of the Civic Platform and the Polish People's Party, the parliamentary election held on 25 October 2015 brought the conservative Law and Justice into power. In the electoral campaign, the party had focused on changes in Poland's internal affairs. Once in power, it adopted new laws designed to circumnavigate the constitutional order. The changes heavily affected the functioning of the Constitutional Court and the National Broadcasting Council (the body in charge of the public media), which led to protests across the country. International institutions (the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) took an interest in the developments.
The European Commission decided to launch the EU's Rule of Law Mechanism in order to assess the situation in Poland In response to the tensions between Poland and the EU institutions, on 23 January 2016 foreign minister Witold Waszczykowski published an article "What Union does Poland want?". The article posits that Poland remains open to dialogue within the EU and promises that it will be an active and responsible member of the EU. Yet it also argues against a supranational, federalized Europe, and advocates the right of individual countries to take decisions that directly concern their own citizens 27 .
Polish Security Policy
Before the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the 2014-onwards conflict in Ukraine, Poland's security situation was considered to be much better than in any other period of its history. There were no border disputes; relations with all neighbours were good; the risk of possible aggression against Poland was also considered minimal. Since 2014, Poland has focused on strengthening its security policy. Poland's security budget is 1.8% GDP, one of the highest proportions in Europe. There was a plan to raise this figure to 2% starting in 2016, but the new Law and Justice administration has put these plans on hold. The main pillars of Poland's security policy are as follows: NATO, the EU, cooperation with the United States, participation in regional and global organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Visegrád Group and the United Nations 28 .
NATO and the guarantees of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty remain at the core of 'hard security' policy. The NATO membership gave Poland access to the largest and stronger military organization in the West (mainly thanks to the participation of the United States) 29 . Poland has been an active member of the alliance, continually engaging in its various efforts to adapt to the changing circumstances. It participated in the NATO operation in Kosovo Recently, Poland has also participated in military EU missions in Chad and the Central African Republic, a training mission Mali, and in operation Althea, i.e. the EU operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
.
Poland has no direct political or economic interests in Africa, but it has acted on the belief that standing in solidarity with the EU member states gives it a moral right to ask for greater involvement of the EU in promoting security, stability and the rule of law to the east of the Polish border, should such a need arise 38 . Poland was disappointed with the EU's lukewarm response to the war in Ukraine in terms of security policy, and thus it has increased its efforts to have NATO bases established in its territory.
Bilateral Relations with EU Member States
Poland has maintained good bilateral relations with all EU member states. Germany, Poland's largest neighbour 39 and biggest trading partner 40 has been particularly important in this respect. Re-orientation of the Polish foreign policy post-1989, Poland's support for the reunification of Germany and Germany's support in the 1990s of Poland's effort to develop good relationship with Western institutions provided a good foundation for political and economic cooperation. Given the two countries' complicated history, the process of reconciliation was particularly noteworthy. It was rendered possible by the fact that both countries embraced democracy, human rights and a pro-European attitude as cornerstones of their policy.
Dialogue between Warsaw and Berlin and their cooperation within the EU was reinforced by the mechanism of Polish-German Intergovernmental Consultations. Bilateral relations further flourished during the financial crisis in Europe after 2008, as Polish-German dialogue played a significant role in drafting EU-wide reform plans. Poland's enthusiasm towards reforms provided a counterweight to Germany's poorly-received attitude, while Germany provided support in budgetary matters.
Germany was also an important ally in promoting democracy in Ukraine and Belarus, and in shaping the policy of EU sanctions towards Russia after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. In the recent years, foreign ministers of Poland and Germany have travelled together to Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova and issued joint statements. In February 2014, along with the French foreign minister, they held mediation in Ukraine that helped end the violence in Maidan in Kiev. On 26 November 2014, Radosław Sikorski and Guido Westerwelle issued a declaration in support of 'a European future for Ukraine' 41 . However, in the following months critical opinions were voiced in Poland -to the effect that Germany made an unsatisfactory 37 Poland decided against participating in the NATO operation against Libya in 2011, despite the suggestions from France that it should became involved. Following the costly operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, it was a time of a more moderate approach of the Polish administration towards Polish participation in missions abroad. There were also considerations with regard to the need to invest in Poland's defence potential. On many issues, the positions of Poland and Germany differed 42 . Poland was very critical towards the construction of the pipeline between Russia and Germany (Nordstream I) and the plans to follow up with Nordstream II. It cited the high costs of the investment and its negative environmental impact, and argued that it violated the principle of energy solidarity 43 . These investments were directly contrary to Poland's interest as a transit state and made it easy for Russia to blackmail Eastern European states (primarily Ukraine). Germany in turn was critical towards the (eventually dismissed) plans to build an American anti-missile system in Poland
44
, and towards Poland's efforts to ensure the location of NATO bases in its territory. Germany's unfavourable views on these two issues were perceived in Poland as obstinate unwillingness to recognize Poland's and Europe's fundamental security needs, and provided fuel for anti-German sentiments among political conservatives.
The influx of refugees and migrants that increased in 2015 also drove a wedge between the two countries. Poland's resistance to the idea of assigned quotas of refugees and migrants was perceived by Germany as a violation of solidarity.
History continues to be a stumbling block in Poland's relations with Germany. One of the most serious issues in the recent years has been the claims for compensation put forward by German compatriots' (local) associations. The ruling of the European Court of Human Rights dated 7 October 2008 on the inadmissibility of the application of Preußische Treuhand against Poland on the grounds of expropriation of property of Germans expulsed from Poland after World War II was an important factor in this regard. The Court held that the application against Poland was inadmissible because the borders were re-drawn and expulsions took place on the basis of decisions of the superpowers at the time Poland was also interested in developing bilateral relations with France. However, due to France's reserved attitude towards a variety of Polish movements (Poland's pursuit of EU membership, its involvement in the war in Iraq on the side of the United States, attempts at EU reform, attempts at adopting a EU constitution), bilateral relations were rather guarded 49 . When a declaration on Polish-French strategic partnership was signed on 28 May 2008, its content was not very solid.
Poland and France stood together with regard to the Common Agricultural Policy, advocating its further development. They also shared a vision for a Europe with greater security and defence capacity. For many years, Poland found it difficult to interest France in the problems of EU's eastern neighbours, given its vested interest in developing a neighbourhood policy to the south and in encouraging Poland's involvement in Africa. The latter efforts were generally successful, with the exception of the intervention in Libya in 2011. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced a new opening in Polish-French relations after François Hollande was elected President on 6 May 2012. The new president declared his support for Poland's initiatives in the EU and offered his assistance in budget negotiations 50 . An aspect to be emphasized is the support for sanctions against Ukraine once the violence broke out on the Maidan in 2013, and against Russia after the annexation of Crimea.
Apart from their bilateral relations, Poland, Germany and France maintained moderate activity levels within the framework of the Weimar Triangle. Poland in particular pursued these relations, which is perceived as potentially advantageous to its position in Europe In view of the conflict in Ukraine, there were difficulties in effectively implementing the Visegrád Group formula as the states within the group differed in their reactions to Russia's policy and actions. Slovakia and Hungary, both strongly dependent on Russian natural gas, feared that excessive sanctions could be detrimental for their countries. In September, after a meeting with Vladimir Putin, the Czech president Miloš Zeman actually argued in favour of lifting the sanctions against Russia.
Poland's Policy towards its Eastern Neighbours
Relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus continue to present an important challenge for Polish foreign policy. Poland's objectives in this respect include: establishing a good relationship with Russia where both parties are treated as equal partners; further development of the relationship between Ukraine and the EU and NATO; and democratization in Belarus. Poland has also supported the Western leanings of Georgia and Moldova. As a country that has itself experienced a successful political transformation, it offered support for reforms, guided by the belief that stable rule of law in the neighbouring countries ensures Poland's security and contributes to a peaceful Europe The war between Russia and Georgia was an obstacle to friendly relations. Polish President Lech Kaczyński was particularly vocal in his criticism of it. The Polish foreign ministry issued an official statement saying that the violation of Georgia's territorial integrity by foreign military forces was unacceptable and criticizing the fact that Russia recognized South Ossetia's and Abkhazia's independence. . In this case, historical issues (in particular the interpretation of the massacres 54 For instance, an agreement on local transborder traffic with Kaliningrad Oblast wad adopted; it entered into force on 27 July 2012. 55 Vladimir Putin gave a speech in Westerplatte on 1 September, and an article authored by him was published in a major Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza. The article discussed the interpretation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and other key events of World War II. The Polish interpretation of these historical events was presented by President Lech Kaczyński in another major daily Rzeczpospolita, also on 1 September, and by foreign minister Radosław Sikorki in Gazeta Wyborcza on 29 August. While noting its certain relativist elements, minister Radosław Sikorski argued that Vladimir Putin's narration 'offered a platform for further discussion'. The Polish government had an overall positive view of the fact that the Russian Prime Minister was present during the commemoration. in Volhynia and the perception of certain historical Ukrainian national heroes) were no obstacle to constructive development of mutual relations 58 .
Close cooperation with Poland was intended to consolidate Ukrainian independence and democracy, and then to support the pro-Western orientation in its politics. Ukraine's independence was perceived as a 'factor that encourages the consolidation of Poland's independence' 59 . The intention was also that an independent Ukraine should be a democratic country that respects human rights (i.e. that its policies should conform to Western standards). In treaties and joint declarations, these values were unfailingly included among the foundations of the relations 60 . Polish politicians frequently stressed the importance of democracy and human rights in relations with Ukraine.
Polish authorities reacted strongly to violations of democratic principles during presidential elections in Ukraine in 2004. President Aleksander Kwaśniewski played an important role in dispelling the crises during the Orange Revolution, making a strong contribution to the attainment of an accord between the Ukrainian authorities and the opposition 61 . He held talks with most European leaders to facilitate an understanding of the events in Ukraine and in support of democracy 62 . At first, the West remained aloof, fearing a deterioration of relations with Russia (which clearly demonstrated its preference for Viktor Yanukovych's victory) 63 .
Polish diplomacy also worked towards securing NATO membership for Ukraine. During the 2009 NATO summit in Bucharest, Poland argued in favour of a MAP (Membership Action Pland) for Ukraine and Georgia. However, Germany and France were thoroughly opposed to this idea, fearing Russia's reaction. Poland's efforts to ensure the MAPs proved unsuccessful, but the work of the Polish diplomacy -and the personal involvement of President Lech Kaczyński -resulted in the inclusion of a declaration of future membership of Ukraine and Georgia in the final documents of the summit. Poland pressed NATO to uphold its 'open doors' policy and continued to cooperate with Ukraine with regard to security and defence.
Poland had high hopes for the Eastern Partnership project, and Ukraine and Moldova had expressed a strong interest in the benefits it offered. However, in view of Ukraine's internal problems (after Viktor Yanukovych became president in February 2010) it became increasingly difficult to promote democracy and close ties with Europe. Despite numerous assurances made to President Bronisław Komorowski at bilateral meetings, President Viktor Janukowycz refused -to some extent due to the strong pressure from Russia -to sign an EU association agreement in Vilnius on 21 November 2013.
As the crisis in Ukraine progressed, mass demonstrations began on Kiev's Maidan, and violence was used against the demonstrators, Polish diplomacy was once again spurred into action. Aware that it has insufficient measures to respond on its own, Poland worked to secure a united European response, and to ensure that the EU would constructively engage in the mediations between the Ukrainian authorities and the opposition and Maidan. The involvement of Prime Minister Donald Tusk and foreign minister Radosław Sikorski in early 2014 reinforced the image of Poland as a leader of EU's eastern policy 64 .
Overall, the reaction of the EU towards the escalation of the crisis was slow and indecisive. The EU was unprepared for the escalation of Russia's confrontational attitude towards Ukraine that led to the annexation 65 and to military engagement in the east of Ukraine. Polish government officially condemned Russia for signing the treaty incorporating the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol into the Russian Federation 66 . The crisis in Ukraine revealed the weakness of Polish-Russian relations. While the Polish authorities communicated with all the parties to the crisis in Ukraine and with their European partners, they were unable to engage at all with their Russian counterparts. Poland was therefore not welcome at the negotiations on ending the Ukrainian conflict.
In view of the progressing conflict in Ukraine, Poland's policy was to support its territorial integrity and sovereignty, and to promote the development of its relationship with the EU. President Bronisław Komorowski signed the bill to ratify the UE-Ukraine association agreement on 17 December 2014. Poland also offered technical assistance and advisory services with regard to local government reform, anti-corruption measures and finance.
While promoting the democratic reforms it had itself undergone, Poland remained aware of its limitations, such as insufficient funding available for this purpose. Poland was also unable to overcome the disinterest of certain elites in the countries to its east with regard to building a closer relationship with Western institutions. This was particularly true with regard to Belarus, governed since 1994 by President Alexander Lukashenko. Despite the numerous diplomatic initiatives and despite the support provided to the civic society in Belarus, Polish involvement there must be considered unsuccessful. However, since democracy beyond its eastern borders is considered vital to Poland's overall security, this involvement will continue. The efforts in this regard are encouraged by the presence of Polish ethnic minorities both in Ukraine and in Belarus. The rights of these ethnic Poles would be best protected in democracies 67 .
Beyond Europe
Poland's involvement in its relations with non-European countries was limited. Given its medium size and capacity, Poland's diplomatic focus was on European, eastern, and transAtlantic policy.
Beyond Europe, Poland sought mainly to boost its international trade, 80% of which takes place within the EU. China has been Poland's biggest trading partner outside the EU, but the relationship is marked by a large deficit. President Bronisław Komorowski's visit to China resulted in a strategic partnership declaration, which elevated the relations between the
